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Abstract
Reinikka and Svensson exploit a unique micro-level data  counterparts,  although government facilities  have better
set on primary  health care facilities in Uganda to address  equipment.  These findings are consistent with the view
the question: What motivates religious not-for-profit  that RNP facilities  are driven  in part by altruistic
(RNP) health care providers?  The authors use two  concerns  and that these preferences matter
approaches to identify whether an altruistic (religious)  quantitatively.  Second,  the authors exploit a near natural
effect exists in the data. First, examining cross-section  experiment  in which the government  initiated a program
variation, they show that RNP facilities  hire qualified  of financial  aid for the RNP sector. They show that
medical staff below the market wage, are  more likely to  financial  aid leads to more laboratory testing of
provide propoor services and services  with a public good  suspected  malaria and intestinal worm cases, and hence
element, and charge lower prices for services than for-  higher quality of service and lower prices, but only  in
profit facilities, although they provide  a similar  RNP facilities. The findings suggest that working for
(observable)  quality of care.  RNP and for-profit facilities  God matters.
both provide better quality care than their government
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In many  developing countries the not-for-profit  sector plays  an important role
in  the  provision  of social  services.  In  the  health  and  education  sectors,  re-
ligious  organizations  are  particularly  prevalent.  What  implications  does  this
have  for the  quantity,  quality,  and  the  price of services?  Clearly,  the  answer
to this question requires  knowledge  about the  not-for-profit  actors'  objectives
and  behavior  as service  providers.  Despite their  importance,  however,  there  is
currently  little such information  available  from  developing  countries.'  In this
paper, we fill this gap with unique data obtained from  a quantitative survey of
government,  private for-profit,  and  private  not-for-profit  (religious)  providers
of primary  health care  in Uganda.
The literature  provides  two  general  explanations  for  what  drives  not-for-
profit  actors.  The first explanation  is based on the premise  that not-for-profit
health facilities are driven by altruistic  (or  religious)  concerns.  This is the very
reason why they  have  chosen to operate  as a  "not-for-profit."  The  alternative
hypothesis stresses the  potential benefit of the regulatory  not-for-profit status.
Specifically,  not-for-profits  (at least in the United States)  enjoy exemption  from
taxation  and  are the main beneficiaries  of charitable  donations.  At the  same
time,  not-for-profits  cannot  directly  appropriate  profits.  Thus,  any  surplus
must  be  used  to  finance  perks  (wages  and  perquisites)  for  the  management
and/or  staff.  The  differential  tax treatment  and  differential  access  to  grants
and donations  between for-profit  and not-for-profit  may  explain why it may be
optimal  for  an entrepreneur  to  choose  a not-for-profit  status.  The regulatory
status, i.e., the nondistribution  constraint,  may also have an additional benefit
as  hypothesized  in  Hansmann  (1980)  and  formalized  in  Glaeser  and  Shleifer
(2000).  Namely,  the nondistribution  constrain  will  make  profits  less valuable
1A  large literature  attempts to identify  the behavior  of not-for-profit  firms or organizations
in  the  developed  world,  especially  in  the United  States.  The  theoretical  work  has  mainly
evolved  around  three  types  of  models;  altruism  models,  which  have  quantity  and  quality
of output  in the  firm's  objective  function;  physician  cooperative  models  that are  analogous
to earlier  cooperative  firm  theories  (Pauly  and Redisch  1973),  and  non-contractible  quality
models, where  for-profit firms have an incentive  to shirk on the quality of service to cut  costs
(for  a review,  see  Malani,  Philipson,  and David  2002;  Lakdawalla  and Philipson  2001)  With
respect  to  the  U.S.  health  sector,  where  most  services  are  produced  by  the  not-for-profit
sector,  empirical  evidence  shows that  not-for-profits  are  larger  (for example,  Rose-Ackerman
1996),  produce  the same  or  higher  quality  services  than  for-profit  firms  (Sloan  and  others
1998,  McClellan  and Staiger  2000),  while  the results  oni costs  are mixed.  Furthermore,  the
empirical  literature  finds  that demand  shocks  increase  the  market  share  of for-profit  firms;
tax increases either raise the share of not-for-profits,  or does not affect  it at all; and somewhat
surprisingly,  that  not-for-profit  firms appear to be more  profitable  than for-profits  However,
their  prices  are not  significantly  higher  than  for-profits  (Malani,  Philipson,  and David  2002;
Philipson  2000, Sloan  and others  1998)for  not-for-profit  firms,  which  in turn will  provide them with softer incentives
and  thereby  protect consumers  from ex post  appropriation.  Since private for-
profit firms are more responsive to profits,  they will have stronger incentives  to
cut costs and pursue ex ante nonverifiable  quality reductions on the service(s)
provided.  This  commitment  problem  may  lead  entrepreneurs  to  choose  the
not-for-profit  status as a means of committing not to reduce quality.
The evidence,  almost exclusively  based on data from the United States,  on
distinguishing  the  different  theories of non-profit  firms  is mixed  (see  footnote
1).  One reason it may be difficult  to disentangle  the three theories  is that the
type of ownership may be endogenous.  For example,  a non-altruistic  entrepre-
neur may  choose  a not-for-profit  status and  locate  in  a poor  neighborhood  if
she expects to benefit from charitable  donations  as a consequence  of this own-
ership/location  choice.  Thus,  although  the  location  choice  will  have  adverse
financial  consequences,  higher  expected  donations  will  compensate  for  them
and  make the ownership/location  choice  optimal  (i.e.,  the total expected  cash
value of perks is  higher when taking donations  into  account).
In this paper we exploit data from primary health care providers in Uganda.
Studying  a poor  developing  country  has two clear  advantages  when  assessing
the underlying  preferences  of  service  providers.  First,  as  discussed  in  more
detail  below,  not-for-profit  primary  health  care providers  in Uganda  are to  a
large extent self-regulated.  The nondistribution  constraint  may therefore  not
be binding, in which case the Hansmann  (1980)  and Glaeser and Shleifer  (2000)
theory is less  relevant.  Second,  the not-for-profit  facilities  have  no obvious tax
advantages  over private-for-profit  firms.  In fact,  for the  mostly  rural primary
health  facilities  we  are  considering,  neither  type  of owner  pays any  direct  or
indirect  taxes.  Moreover,  until  1999/2000  (the fiscal  year  for  which  we  have
data) donations play a marginal role in financing primary health care providers'
recurrent operations.  Thus, at least prior to 1999/2000,  there were no obvious
advantages  for  a nonaltruistic  entrepreneur  to choose  a not-for-profit  status.
However,  the self-regulatory  status raises another concern,  namely that the
preferences  of the  owner,  or  the  founder  (for  instance  a Catholic  parish)  and
the manager may differ.  In particular,  the facility may be captured  by a man-
ager with different  objectives  from the owner.2 Clearly,  capture can  take many
forms  (and be  of varying  degrees)  and  some  forms  (degrees)  cannot  easily  be
2  Glaeser (2002) argues  that weak board control may be just as important as the differential
tax privileges/donations  and nondistribution  constraint in explaining the behavior of the not-
for-profit  firms  Thus capture  is not  specific  to not-for-profits  in poor developing  countries,
although  it seems plausible  that boards in  general  have  stronger control  in the U.S.  not-for-
profit sector than in the Ugandan  primary health care sector  (see discussion in section 2).  The
capture argument is also close to the Pauly and Redisch  (1973)  view of hospitals as physicians'
cooperatives.
2measured.  In particular,  as argued  by Glaeser  (2002),  the workers'  preferences
are often themselves altruistic and they often internalize the stated goals of the
firm  or organization.  What  we  can  test  is  whether  the not-for-profit  service
facilities  act  as  profit-  or  perquisites-maximizing  firms,  or  whether  they  are
systematically  different.
We  take  two  approaches  to  identify  whether  religious  affiliation  (not-for-
profit  status)  matters.  The first builds  on the assumption  that we can  identify
the behavior of the not-for-profit  providers  by comparing  their performance  in
various  dimensions  with  government  and private  for-profit  providers.  Specifi-
cally,  we exploit  the cross-section  variation  across types of ownership,  control-
ling for other  confounding  observable  characteristics  and unobserved  location-
specific effects.  The idea is that since the behavior of private for-profit providers
(presumably driven by profit maximization)  and government-operated  units (to
a large extent regulated by central and local authorities to  deliver  a minimum
package of services)  is generally quite well understood,  by comparing outcomes,
we  can  learn  about  the  objectives  of the  not-for-profit  actors.  To  guide  the
empirical  work,  we develop  a simple  model  of the not-for-profit  providers  and
derive the implications  for their choice of wages,  prices, service mix, and quality
of care under the two alternative  hypotheses  laid out above.
The second  approach  relies  on a  near natural  policy experiment  of public
financial  aid  for  the not-for-profit  sector.3 In  1999,  the year  of the  survey,
the government  initiated  a program  in  which  each  not-for-profit  health  unit
in a given  category  (e.g.,  dispensaries)  was  to receive  an  untied  grant  for  the
fiscal  year.  As  this  was  a  new  and  unanticipated  program  and  due to  poor
communications  on the government's part, some not-for-profit  facilities  did not
receive  their  grant  until  the  following  year.  This  de  facto  phasing-in  of the
financial  aid  program  provides  a  source  of (what  we  argue  to  be)  exogenous
variation that  we can  exploit  to identify the effects  of ownership.
In the cross section,  we find  that religious not-for-profit  facilities  hire qual-
ified  medical  staff  below the  market  wage.  Moreover,  religious  not-for-profit
facilities are more likely to provide pro-poor services  and services with a public
good element,  and charge strictly lower prices  for services  than for-profit  units.
Religious not-for-profit  and for-profit facilities  both provide better quality care
than their government  counterparts, although government  facilities have better
equipment.  These  findings are  consistent with  a premium  in working  in a reli-
3Duggan  (2000)  also studies the diffential  response of not-for-profit versus for-profit health
facilities  (hospitals)  to a natural experiment  induced  by  a government  subsidy  program.  He
examines  hospitals affected  by  California's  Disproportionate  Share  program  and shows  that
the behavior  of not-for-profit  hospitals varies  with the share  of nearby hospitals organized  as
for-profit  firms.  increased  for-profit  penetration  makes  not-for-profit  hospitals  more  profit-
oriented.
3gious not-for-profit  facility and that religious not-for-profits  are driven (partly)
by altruistic concerns.  The near natural experiment  reveals  that financial  aid
leads to more testing of suspected malaria and intestinal  worm cases and lower
prices  in religious-not-for-profit  facilities.  Moreover,  the estimated  effects  are
substantial.  Thus,  working for God appears  to matter!
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows.  Section 2 describes the institu-
tional setting of health care in Uganda,  including ownership  and management
of health  facilities  (in  particular  dispensaries),  the  labor  market  and  human
resources  in  health  care,  and  the  government  financial  aid  program  to  not-
for-profit  health  providers.  Sections  3  and  4  present  a  simple  model  of the
behavior  of a religious not-for-profit  health  facility,  develop  two extensions  of
the model,  and lay out the inference  procedure.  Section 5  discusses the survey
data used in the empirical  analysis.  Section  6 presents the empirical evidence
from  the cross-section  regressions.  Section  7 explores  the  impact of financial
aid on service  delivery.  Section 8 concludes.
2  Hlstitutional  setting ian  healt  care
It is commonly held that Uganda had a well-functioning public service delivery
system in the 1960s.  Health care was provided free of charge, and access to care
was  relatively  good.  Steady  improvements  were  experienced  in most  health
indicators.  However,  as  a  result  of the political  and  military  turmoil  of the
1970s and 1980s, the government de facto retreated from funding and providing
public  services.  In primary  education,  which  was  nationalized  in  the  1970s,
the vacuum  was  filled  by parents  who  gradually  took over running the public
schools  (Reinikka  and  Svensson  2002).  In  health  care  the burden  was  taken
up  by  private  for-profit  sector  and  religious  providers.  The  latter  were  able
to  mobilize external  resources  to sustain activities  during the turbulent  times
(Republic of Uganda  2001a).  Despite efforts  by the private for-profit  and not-
for-profit  sectors,  health indicators fell dramatically.
Following restoration  of peace  in the  late-1980s  and subsequent  economic
recovery,  government  implemented  a major program of infrastructure  rehabili-
tation in the (public)  health sector in the  1990s.  This coincided  with political,
administrative,  and  financial  decentralization,  which  led  to limited  recurrent
funding for health facilities,  as districts prioritized areas other than health care
(Jeppson  2001).  As  a  result  the quality  of  public  services  did not  improve
at the same pace  with infrastructure,  which  is reflected  in the continued  high
demand  for  privately provided  care  (Hutchinson  2001).  Some  key  health  in-
dicators  did  not  improve  as  expected,  despite  a  GDP  growth  rate  of over  6
4percent  and  a 40-percent  reduction  in  consumption  poverty in the 1990s  (Ap-
pleton 2001).  Specifically,  the infant mortality  rate stagnated during the latter
half of the 1990s  at 88 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2001  (Republic  of Uganda
2002).  Mortality  during  the  first month  is particularly  high.  The underlying
reasons for the stagnant trend include high fertility, short birth intervals,  and a
high proportion of home deliveries.  These factors remained constant during the
period.  The fall in immunization rates-partly attributed to decentralization-
made  the situation  worse  (Moeller  2002).  HIV/AIDS  must play  a role in  this
stagnation,  but malaria  (51  percent)  and diarrhoea  (19 percent)  are the  most
important  direct  causes  of infant  mortality  in  Uganda.  Recent  trends  in the
clinical  causes of infant deaths  are, however,  not available.
Today  the  modern  health  sector  in  Uganda  is  composed  of four  types  of
facilities:  hospitals,  health  centers,  dispensaries  (health  center  III),  and  aid
posts or subdispensaries.  These facilities can be government, private for-profit,
or  private  not-for-profit  operated  and  owned.  The  health  facility  survey  we
exploit  in this paper has the dispensary  (with or without  a maternity unit)  as
its  unit of observation.  Dispensaries  are  the most common health facility  and
an important  health service  provider  in Uganda.  Most  dispensaries  are rural
(89 percent).
According  to  the  government  health  sector  strategic  plan,  the  standard
for  dispensaries  includes  preventive,  promotional,  outpatient  care,  maternity,
general ward,  and laboratory  services  (Republic of Uganda  2000).  An  average
dispensary has eight beds for inpatient  care and serves  a population  of 20,000.
Dispensaries usually do not have a medical doctor (although some do), and are
managed by a either clinical  officer  or a comprehensive  or registered  nurse.
Factors  that  have  determined  where  dispensaries  have  been  located  over
time include  population  density  and  growth,  accessibility,  existence  of other
units,  health needs,  and  poverty  rates.  Similarly,  national  and  local  politics,
communities  building  their  own  units,  and  the  preferences  of not-for-profits,
donors  and  even  the  colonial  authorities  have  had  their  impact.  More  re-
cently, both the government and the medical bureaux have attempted to provide
(sometimes conflicting)  guidelines  on where to put new not-for-profit  facilities,
mostly centered  around filling  gaps in geographic  coverage.
2.1  Ownership and management  of health facilities
The  private not-for-profit health  sector  in  Uganda  consists  of  religious  and
nonreligious  providers.4 The first ever census on the not-for-profit  health care
4This section draws considerably  on interviews  and communications  with health praction-
ers and public officials in Uganda,  as many aspects  of private health care provision  are poorly
5sector  in Uganda carried out in  2001  indicated that autonomous  dioceses  and
parishes  own  70  percent  of  all  private  not-for-profit  health  facilities,  which
total  450 lower-level  units  and 42  hospitals  (Republic  of Uganda  2001b).  The
rest  are owned by nongovernmental  organizations  (16 percent),  some of which
are  also religious, community-based  organizations  (6 percent),  and by district
councils,  mosques,  and  individuals  (8  percent).  The  census  also  shows  that
most private not-for-profit  health facilities  (82 percent)  are coordinated  by one
of  three  national  umbrella  organizations:  Catholic,  Protestant,  and  Muslim
medical  bureaux.
The first religious  not-for-profit  health unit  was established  by missionar-
ies  in  1897  (Republic  of Uganda  2001a).  Thereafter  churches  and  missionar-
ies  have set up hospital  and health centers  throughout  the  country.5 At their
departure,  missionaries  handed over the management  to the local church  (dio-
cese  or parish).  In the  last  three  decades,  as  new  parishes  were  established,
they  (usually  initiated  by the  parish  priest)  routinely set up their  own social
services,  particularly  health  services.  In many cases  parishioners  contributed
to the investment  cost of these  facilities,  sometimes  aided  by donations  from
the respective  medial  bureau  or outside sources.  The majority of dispensaries
owned by religious providers were built between  1960 and  1990.  In our sample,
the median  year of establishment  is  1983.
Not-for-profit  health care providers are self-regulated  and self-governing.  At
the time of our survey, there was no certification  for not-for-profit status (either
by a medical  bureau or  by the government).  Hence,  the  in-charge  of the  not-
for-profit  health  unit  together  with  the  unit-specific  management  committee
were free to decide on the mix and price of services  provided by the facility.
The  Uganda  Catholic  Medical  Bureau  recently  initiated  an  accreditation
process and issued guidelines  for lower-level health units affiliated with it stating
the following  (2001,  p.1):
"Diocesan health units are different,  they do not aim at profit.  The
money  left  over  is  to be  used  for  improving the services,  lowering
the fees,  or increasing the salaries.  No funds should go to the owner
or  the  parish.  These  health  units  aim to offer  health  services  as
good  and  as  cheap  as possible,  from  a healing  mission.  They  try
to  be  well  organized,  aim  at  integration  in the  District,  and  are
community-oriented."
documented
5Since  expatriates  were not allowed  to own  fixed assets,  missionaries established  the units
in  the name of the  diocese or paxish
6The accreditation  procedure was initiated in response to government's financial
aid program  to non-profits  (see  details in section  2.3).  But in  1999/2000  (the
year  of  the  survey),  if any  of  these  rules  were  followed,  compliance  by  the
facilities was voluntary.
It is worth noting that the institutional structure  of the not-for-profit  sector
is considerably  different  from the government's  institutional  framework.  Most
importantly,  the medical bureaux operated by various  religious denominations
do not have administrative  authority over  the individual units or owners  (that
is, dioceses  or parishes).
In the  publzc  sector, the  Health  Sector  Strategic  Plan  determines  facility
standards  and  the  mix  of  services  to  be  provided  at  each  level  (Republic  of
Uganda  2000).  Both  central  and  local  government  authorities  attempt  to  en-
force  these  standards  by  controlling inputs,  say,  by setting staffing  norms,  by
supplying  pharmaceuticals,  vaccines,  and  equipment,  and by  direct  transfers
and  investment  funding.  In  addition,  they  issue  management  and  technical
guidelines  and supervise  health  facilities.  Public  health  facilities  have  also  a
unit-specific management  committee  to represent  the local  community and pa-
tients.  Due to a variety of factors,  such as difficulties  in recruitment of qualified
medical  staff,  and the availability  or absence  of funding,  the  actual  picture  on
the ground  may vary  from the set  standards.
Prvate  for-profit practice began decades ago with a few  medical practition-
ers in urban  areas.  Their  numbers grew dramatically  during the economic  and
political  turmoil of the 1970s  and  1980s  (Republic  of Uganda  2001a).  Private
health care was provided by a mixture of licensed and unlicensed private clinics,
pharmacies,  drug  shops,  and  home  providers,6 and  little  systematic  informa-
tion is  available  on these providers.  Many medical  professionals working  in the
public sector  are believed to  also have a private  practice  to earn  extra income
(McPake  and  others  1999),  but  factual  evidence  of this  practice,  particularly
in the case  of dispensaries,  is limited.
Finally, while  all health service providers  are exempt  from the value added
tax,  private  for-profit  provider  are,  in  principle,  expected  to pay  income  tax,
as  well  as  the  pay-as-you-earn  tax for  their  employees.  But  there  are  major
problems  in compliance.  Thus, apart from a few private clinics in Kampala (the
capital),  the private  for-profit dispensaries  are de  facto tax exempt.  Religious
providers  are also exempt  from the income  tax.7
6In principle,  the national professional  councils  are supposed  to regulate  both private  for-
profit  and  not-for-profit  facilities  (but not  government  facilities)  by  licensing  them,  setting
standards,  and monitoring their premises.  This regulatory  system  is not working  in practice.
7Actually,  the current tax code in Uganda does not even recognize  the not-for-profit status
Still (or as  a result of this), there have been attempts by local authorities to impose taxation on
the not-for-profit  facilities'  revenues,  but  the facilities and medical  bureaux have successfully
72.2  Labor market  and human resources  in health care
While the  total  number of medical  personnel  has  increased  since  1972,  it has
not kept  pace with population  growth  (Hutchinson  2001).  Many medical stu-
dents leave the country after completing their education to work in neighboring
countries  or go  further  afield  where  salaries  are  higher.  In  1996 one  medical
person  was  available  for  every  2,350  people,  while  in  1972  one  medical  per-
son was  available  for  half that many people.  The  absolute number of doctors
actually  declined  during the same period  (by  18 percent).
The  distribution  of medical  personnel  is  uneven.  The  three largest  cities
with  less  than  10  percent  of the  country's  population  account  for  nearly  60
percent of its doctors.  Since almost half of government health sector employees
work  in hospitals,  many careseekers  bypass  the  lower-level  units  and  use hos-
pitals instead:  in  1998  only  15  percent  of hospital  patients  had been  referred
from lower-level  facilities  (Okello  and others  1998).
The  quality  of  health  personnel  is  also  a  major  problem.  In  the  public
and not-for  profit sectors,  about 40 percent of established  health positions  are
currently  filled  by staff  with  medical  training.  The remaining  positions  are
filled  by  nursing aides-with  no medical training-hired by local governments
or facilities  themselves,  or are left  vacant.
2.3  Financial  aid for non-profits
The two umbrella organizations for not-for-profit health providers-the Uganda
Protestant  Medical  Bureau  and  the Uganda  Catholic  Medical  Bureau-were
established  in  the  1950s  to coordinate  disbursement  of government  grants to
religious health care providers.  While public subsidies continued  after indepen-
dence,  over time the relations between  religious  providers  and the government
deteriorated,  as  there was  competition  and  a perceived  difference  in pay  and
privileges  (Republic of Uganda 2001a).  During the decline in public services  in
the 1970s and 1980s, subsidies to not-for-profits  dwindled and eventually ceased
altogether.  In response  to the disappearing  public support, not-for-profits  had
to resort to user fees and external donations.  The two bureaux also established
a joint medical  store to supply  their  affiliated  facilities  with drugs  and other
medical  consumables  and  equipment.8 In the early  1970s  the Uganda Muslim
Supreme  Council  also established  a similar  permanent  coordinating structure.
Over  time, the  importance  of external  donations  declined.  In our sample
lobbied against the tax claims.
8Today  all types  of health-care  providers can purchase  drugs from the joint medical  store
and hence  take advantage  of its bulk purchase  prices.
8of (religious)  not-for-profit facilities,  only 3 out of 44 not-for-profit dispensaries
received donations  from private sources  and only  2 out of 44 facilities  received
funds from the donor community  in fiscal year  1999/2000.9
In 1997/98 the government reinstated financial aid to hospitals.  In 1999/2000
a new program extended  a similar subsidy  to lower-level health  units.  The  fi-
nancial aid program prescribed that each not-for-profit  unit in a given  category
(e.g., dispensaries)  was to receive a fixed-amount grant for the fiscal year.  Each
dispensary  was to receive  the same  amount,  namely 2.5  million  shillings  ($US
1,400)  a year.  Each dispensary with  a maternity unit was to receive  3.4 million
Ush  ($US  1,900).  In  subsequent  years  the  allocation  system  was  to  become
more  refined,  to  include  both performance  and  needs-based  criteria.  The ad-
ministrative  problems  getting program  off the ground  are  discussed  in  section
7.
3  Conceptual  framework
Next  we  lay  out  a simple  framework  to  analyze  not-for-profit  behavior.  We
consider three models.  The first two models implicitly  assume that the (altru-
istic owner's)  not-for-profit  facility  is captured  by a nonaltruistic  manager(s).
In the first  model,  the  nondistribution  constraint  is  not binding,  so  the not-
for-profit  provider  acts  as  a profit-maximizer.  In the second  version,  we  as-
sume the constraint binds  (i.e.,  it  is enforced),  in which case the not-for-profit
provider  maximizes  perquisites  instead.  The third  model  assumes  that  (reli-
gious)  not-for-profit  facilities  maximize the total health impact of its activities,
here conceptualized  as the number of patients treated.10
We  start  by  solving  the  simplest  version  of  the three  models,  and  then
consider two extensions:  endogenous  quality and costs.
3.1  Basics
A manager for a not-for-profit health facility i must hire workers to work in the
facility and agree on wages w,,.  Each  worker j  can perform  one task or service.
9As stressed  above,  donations  were  more important  in  the  1970s  and  1980s,  as  well as at
the start-up phase,  when raising  funds for  construction  We  have some indirect  evidence  for
the latter.  Of the 29  not-for-profit  facilities  that  had renovated their  facility  in the past,  14
received  financial support  from private and/or  donor sources.
'°Clearly,  conceptualizing  altruism in the health sector with the number of patients treated
is  not  uncontroversial.  See  Malani,  Philipson,  and  David  (2002)  for  a  review  of altruism
models that typically  have quantity  (and/or quality) of output in the not-for-profit's objective
function.
9There are S potential services.  Thus, a facility can at the most have S workers.
There is a pool of workers who differ with respect  to the value placed on working
in a not-for-profit  facility.  Specifically,  a worker j's utility is u(wi,) +  3,NFP,
where  u(w)  is  a  concave  function,  NFP is  an indicator  variable  taking  the
value  1 if the  worker  is  employed  by an  altruistic  not-for-profit  facility  (and
zero otherwise),  and  6,  is the nonmonetary  gains  of worker j  of working in  a
not-for-profit  facility.  6j is thus  a measure  of a worker's  altruism  or (religious)
beliefs  about the  importance  of working  in  a not-for-profit  facility.  We  label
3j as the  "religious  premium".  Each worker can get a job in the public sector,
which pays the wage  v.11
The manager must  also decide what services to provide  and prices  of these
services.  The  total  cost of producing  a given  service  s  e  S that  x,  patients
will  be buying is w,  +  cx8,  where  w,  is the  wage cost  of the  worker  assigned
to produce  service s,  and  c  is the  (constant)  marginal  cost.  We  thus  assume
that a worker will be paid the same amount irrespective of the number patients
treated.  The inverse-demand  function for health service s  is ps = P(x 5)  where
pa is the price  and PI  (xZ)  < 0.  We let es  denote the elasticity of demand with
respect to price for service s.  The facility  is assumed  to be a local monopolist.
3.2  The profit-maximizing  not-for-proilt  facility
The total cash profits  of facility i is 7r = Es, [P(x,)x,  - w,  - cz,], where  S, is
the set  of services  offered  by facility i.  We assume  that workers  do not obtain
any additional  noncash  gains  of working in a profit-maximizing  not-for-profit
facility;  that  is,  6,  =  0.  A profit-maximizing  facility  can  hire  an  unlimited
number  of workers at the wage iD. Its maximization  problem  is  thus,
SI
max  E  [P(x,)x,  - C-X]  - (1)
The first  order condition  of activity s can be stated as,
P(Xz)  1-  ] -c  <0.  (2)
Equation  (2)  is a standard condition  for profit maximization;  the price will
be set to equate  the marginal  revenue  (first  term in  (2))  with the  (constant)
marginal  cost.  Equation  (2)  implicitly  defines  the optimal quantity  x*  and by
"The  assumption  of excess demand  of workers  by the  public sector at (the administrative
set)  wage iv, is a good approximation  of the health market for qualified  staff in Uganda  given
the  economywide  shortage of qualified staff.
10the inverse-demand  function  the price  p* that creates  this  demand.  Since  the
marginal cost is the same for each service, the marginal revenue for each service
being provided  must  also be the same.  That is,
P(Xz)  [1  - = P(xt)  1-]  = C.  (3)
Clearly,  from  (3)  it  follows  that  the facility  will charge  a  higher price  for
the service with low elasticity of demand.
Equation  (2)  is  a necessary  condition  for profit maximization.  In addition,
each  service  must yield  non-negative  profits.  That is,  the  facility  will provide
the service  s only if
P(Z*8X*  )8-  - cx* > 0.  (4)
3.3  The perquisites-maximizing  not-for-profit  facility
Following  Glaeser  and  Shleifer  (2001),  we  assume that  if the nondistribution
constraint binds, the manager is forced to spend profits on perquisites,  denoted
by  z.  The utility  of spending profits  on perquisites  is v(z)  = az, where  ca <  1
is a constant.
As with the  profit  maximizer,  we  assume  that workers  do  not  obtain  any
additional noncash  gains of working in a perquisites-maximizing  not-for-profit
facilities;  that is,  53  = 0.  Its maximization  problem  is thus,
SI
max a  E  [P(xz)xs-w-cxs].  (5)
Clearly,  the  first-order condition  of activity s,  and  the non-negative  profit
constraint are identical to  (2)  and (4).  Thus, a perquisites-maximizing  not-for-
profit  facility  will set  the  same  prices  p*  as  a for-profit  facility.  Moreover,  it
will  pay  workers the same  wage  as  a for-profit  facility,  and it  will  also choose
to provide  the same  set of services.
If private-for-profit  and  private  not-for-profit  facilities  only  differ  in  the
ease  in with  which  a facility  can  appropriate  profits,  and  if facilities  decision
variables  are  (i)  which services to provide,  (ii) the prices  of these  services,  and
(iii)  wages  to  their  workers,  we  should  not observe  any  differences  between
private-for-profit  and private  not-for-profit  facilities.
3.4  The altruistic not-for-profit  facility
The third assumes that private not-for-profit facilities maximize the total health
impact of its  activities.  Clearly,  the  total  health impact  could  be defined  in  a
11variety  of ways.  Here  we choose  to operationalize  it as  the number  of (poor)
patients  treated.  That is, the private not-for-profit  facilities maximize ZSt  Xs,
subject  to the constraint that  Sst [P(X 8 )X 8 - - cx 8]  > 0.
Consider  first  the  choice  of workers.  A  manager  for  an  altruistic  facility
will  try to  hire workers  biased  toward  working  in  a not-for-profit  facility.  To
simplify the exposition,  assume there are two large group of workers,  one with
68 =  0  and one  with  6, = 6 >  0.  The  not-for-profit  facility will  hire workers
with  6, = 6 and  pay them  the  wage  w =  u-1 [u(wD)  - 6].  Note  that  w  < w.
Thus, the not-for-profit  facility will exploit the workers' moral  gains of working
in a not-for-profit  facility  by offering  a lower  wage.  The wage is set so that at
the margin, a worker with a positive religious premium is indifferent to working
in a not-for-profit  facility or a for-profit  facility.
To solve  the  altruistic  not-for-profit  manager's  maximization  problem  we
formulate  the Lagrange  function,
Si  S,\
L =  Exs  +  A(  [P(xs)xs  -D  -c])  X  (6)
where A is the Lagrange  multiplier.  Maximizing  the Lagrange  function yields
the following first order conditions,
+ A[P(X)  [  eI]  c]  <0 VsESi  (7)
and
SI
Z [P(X 8 )X8 -i-cX 8 ] = 0  (8)
Dividing the first-order conditions  (7) for two services  s  and t, we see that
P(x[)  1 - 6  - c
That is,
P(XZ)  [1 - ]  P(xt)  [1  ]  (10)
Thus, as for the profit- or perquisites-maximizing  not-for-profit  facility,  the
marginal revenue for each service being provided will be the same.  Thus, higher
prices  will be charged  for services  with low elasticity  of demand.  The intuition
is straightforward.  Given the zero-profit  condition (8),  and given that different
patient types are perfect substitutes, if the marginal revenues differ,  the facility
12can provide one less patient with the service with the lowest marginal revenue,
and  instead  provide  more  than  one  extra  patient  with  the  service  with  the
highest  revenue.  Thus,  by shifting  types  of  patients  treated,  the  aggregate
number  of patients  treated could be  raised.
Note that (7) implies that prices will be set such that the marginal return is
strictly lower than the marginal cost.  That is, an altruistic not-for-profit facility
will  charge lower prices  than  a profit-  or perquisites-maximizing  not-for-profit
facility.  Thus,  an  altruistic  provider  will  tend  to cross-subsidize  services.  In
particular, whereas a perquisites-maximizing  not-for-profit facility (or a private
for-profit facility)  would never provide a service it cannot make a positive profit
from;  i.e., for which  (4)  does not hold, an altruistic provider may do so in order
to increase  the total number of patients  treated.
3.5  Quality of care
So  far  we  have  assumed  that  quality  of  care  is  exogenous.  Assume  now  in-
stead  that  before  (or  simultaneously)  choosing  what  services  to  provide,  the
manager/facility  also makes  an effort  choice that influences  the quality of the
services  being  provided.  Let the  inverse  demand function  be  Pa = P(x8,  q),
where  q  is  effort  and  Pq  >  0  and  Pxq  >  0.  We  assume  that higher  quality
services  imply both higher financial  and nonfinancial  (effort)  costs.  Total cash
profit  is  now  7r  =  E  [P(x8,q)x  - w-  cx,  -C(q)],  where  Cq(q)  >  0 and
Cqq(q) > 0.  The manager must also bear a noncash cost of exerting effort given
by  y  (q),  where  -yq  (q)  > 0 and  Yqq (q)  > 0.
Consider first  a for-profit  provider.  The additional  first-order  condition  is
given  in  (11),
s,
_'Yq  (q) +  E  Pq(x,  q)zx  - Cq(q) < 0  (11)
The  two first-order  conditions  (11)  and  (2)  define  the  optimal  price  and
quality for service  s.
The first-order condition  for the quality choice for a perquisites-maximizing
provider  is
-Yq  (q) +  (  Pq(xa, q)X-C,(q))  < 0.  (12)
Totally differentiating the  first-order conditions  (12)  and (2),  using the im-
plicit function theorem  (see  appendix),  it is possible to show that the quality of
care of the for-profit facility exceeds that of the perquisites-maximizing  facility.
Higher  quality of services will  also allow the facility to demand a higher price.
13This is an intuitive  result.  Providing  higher quality services requires nonfinan-
cial  costs  (effort).  Since private  for-profit  firms are more  responsive to profits,
a for-profit  provider has stronger  incentives to put in high  effort.
Consider next the altruistic  facility.  The first-order  conditions  of the altru-
istic provider's maximization program  are  given in (7),  (13)  and  (14).
- 7 Yq  (q) - A  (  Pq(xs, q)x8 - Cq(q)) < 0  (13)
E  [P(x 3, q)xs  - w.-  cx] - C(q) < 0  (14)
Higher  quality  will  increase  demand  and  allow  the  altruistic  provider  to
treat  more patients.'2 Without further restrictions  on the model,  however,  we
cannot  say  if the  altruistic facility  will exert  more  or less  effort  than the  for-
profit provider.  However,  what  we can  say  is  that only  an altruistic  provider
will tend to  cross-subsidize  services,  and thus  can  provide  a service  it cannot
make  a profit  from.  It will  also pay their  workers  less.  Moreover,  conditional
on  the quality  choice  being  similar,  an  altruistic provider  will charge  strictly
lower  prices.
3.6  Endogenizing  cost
In the  baseline model,  (marginal)  cost  is constant and exogenous.  However,  it
is reasonable  to think  that facilities  can  partly  influence  their  cost  structure.
For example,  a facility could reduce cost by ex post shirking on quality.  Below
we consider  how such an extension  would affect  the results.
Glaeser and  Shleifer  (2001),  building on Hansmann  (1980),  argue that pri-
vate not-for-profit  firms face softer incentives which protect consumers from  ex
post appropriation.  Since private for-profit firms are more responsive  to profits,
they will  have  stronger incentives  to pursue  cost  and  nonverifiable  quality re-
ductions on the service(s) provided.  It is straightforward  to incorporate Glaeser
and  Shleifer's mechanism in the model
Let the inverse  demand  function now  be given  by p5 = P(x,, qe)  where  qe
is  the expected  quality  of the service  being  provided,  with  Pq  > 0.  Unit cost
is c = C(q), with  Cq  >  0  and  Cq  > 0.  As in Glaeser  and  Shleifer  (2001),  the
manager  must bear a noncash  cost of 8(qe  - q)  of shirking on  quality.
'2In  the standard  (reduced  form)  altruism  model,  the  provider  cares  about  quantity and
quality.  Obviously,  if quality has its own  value  for the altruistic provider,  this would  provide
even stronger incentives  to supply  high-quality care.
14In this set up, when the manager  chooses q, he has already collected revenues
(thus  he  takes  the  price  and  demand  as  given).  The perquisites-maximizing
not2for-profit  facility's optimal  quality reducing choice is  given  by,
-aCq(q)  (  2S  +,  < 0  (15)
Rational  patients  will  anticipate  the  manager's  ex  post  incentives.  Thus,  in
equilibrium  q* =  qe.  The  for-profit  provider's  equilibrium  condition  is  the
same  as  in (15),  with a = 1.
Total differentiating  (15)  yields,
dq  Cq - d  = _  C  < 0 .
da  CeCqq
Thus, the nonverifiable  quality of the not-for-profit  facility  exceeds  that of
the for-profit  facility.  Lower quality (which is expected in equilibrium)  will lead
to lower  costs.  Lower quality will also lead to lower demand.  Both factors  lead
to lower  prices.  Lower demand will tend to reduce the number of services that
can  be provided,  although  this force  is counteracted  by  lower  cost.  Without
further  restrictions  on the  model,  it  is  unclear  how  service  provision  will  be
affected.
The  altruistic  facility  will  have no  incentives  to  shirk ex  post  on  quality,
since this will not affect  (ex post) the number of patients that could be treated.
4  Implications  and specification
The  predictions  of the  baseline  and  the  extended  versions  of  the  model  are
summarized  in Table  1. The baseline  model suggests that we could test for the
not-for-profit  facilities'  objective  function  by  running  the  following  regression
on a sample  of facilities with different  owners,
Y.  =  /  + MNPNPz + IpFPt  + es  (16)
where the dependent  variable  y,,  is either s,,;  a indicator  if service  s  is  being
provided or not by facility i, p,,; the price of service s charged by facility S,  wu,;
the wage paid to worker of type j  in facility i,  or q1; the quality of services.  NPi
is a dummy indicating if the facility  is  not-for-profit,  and FPz is  a dummy in-
dicating if the facility is private for-profit.  The ownership  category  excluded  in
(16)  is government.  The perquisites-maximizing  not-for-profit  facility  hypoth-
esis  suggests  that  3P = fy  p  for  y.,  =  {sis,pt.,  w.3},  whereas  the  altruistic
15not-for-profit  facility  hypothesis  suggests that /3 p  >  /5P,  OPP  < /PFp,  and
ONP <  FP-
Endogenizing  cost  and  allowing  facilities  to  also  choose  quality,  makes  it
more  difficult,  using observed  prices,  wages,  and  service  provision,  to distin-
guish between the not-for-profit's objectives.  In particular,  there are parameter
configurations  for  which  we cannot  reject  either  of the two hypotheses.  How-
ever, only the altruistic  model, under all model specifications,  is consistent with
the prediction  that /i  p  > 88 p, /p  p  < IpFp,  wpP  <  Fwp  and  I3  p  =  ,FaP
This implication  therefore  forms the basis for the empirical  analysis.
While  the  model  provides  a  starting point  to  assess  the  behavior  of not-
for-profit  facilities, it  is clearly  based on a number of simplifying  assumptions.
Thus, the question is whether an association between ownership and outcomes,
from a regression  like (16),  is  a causal  relationship.  In particular,  the different
types may have other characteristics that are also associated with the dependent
variable  y.  For example,  for-profit  and not-for profit  providers  may locate  in
different  areas and  thus face  different  demand.
We  consider  two  strategies  to  identify  a  causal  relationship  in  the data:
controlling for other confounding  observables  (discussed  below)  and exploiting
a near natural  experiment  of financial  aid to not-for-profits  from government
(discussed  in section 7).
In the cross-section  analysis, identification  is based on the assumption that
we can control  for variables  that  are confounded  with  ownership  and the  de-
pendent variable.  Thus,  we will estimate an equation  of the following form,
Yi.  =  pY +  YNpNPi +  I3 pFP,  +  13'y  XS  +  ei,  (17)
where  Xi,  is a vector of other controls.  Below we discuss  the controls  we use.
In the baseline  regression,  we  proxy for  the degree  of competition  by  in-
cluding as  a control  the  "number of competitors",  i.e., number of dispensaries
and health centers  in the facility's catchment  area.  In the model,  each  facility
acts like a local monopolist.  In reality,  patients have some  choice about where
to seek health  service  (although  the data suggest  that  proximity  is  the  most
important  factor overall  for selecting a given facility),  so the market structure
may be important.
Not-for-profit facilities receive (limited) in-kind support (medicine and staff)
that may shift the marginal cost curve and thus influence  y.  We explicitly con-
trol  for  this by  including  a  measure  of the value  of free  drugs  received  and
a  variable  capturing  the  full-time  equivalent  number  of staff working  in  the
facility  for free.
Because  each  facility's  location,  in  principle,  is  endogenous,  determining
whether it is ownership per se or location or some other factor that is correlated
16with  location  that drives  any  observable  differences  in outcome  could present
a difficult identification  problem.  However,  in practice  it is  less  of a problem.
First,  as discussed  above,  most  not-for-profit  facilities  were  established  many
years  ago.  Given the large social  and economic changes  in Uganda  during the
last  few decades, the local situation  may have changed  dramatically  for  many
facilities.  Second,  empirically,  we  can  (to  some  extent)  control  for location
by  including  controls such  as  distance  to closest  subcounty  headquarters  and
district-specific  effects.  Thus, we identify the ownership effects from the within-
district variation.  Finally,  and most importantly, it is possible to reinterpret the
model, letting the choice of services  to provide  and the prices  of these services,
really  be  a choice  of where  to  locate.  If not-for-profit  facilities  are  driven  by
altruistic  concerns,  they would  tend to  locate in poor areas  where they would
not  be able to charge  high prices.  If not-for-profit  facilities  are not  driven by
altruistic concerns, they would  instead tend to locate in areas  where they, just
like for-profit  facilities,  could  maximize profits.  This reduced form approach  is
valid as  long as we attempt to measure  underlying  objectives  (preferences).
5  Data
A number  of tools  exist  to collect  and  analyze  service  provider  behavior,  in-
cluding facility modules in household surveys and empirical studies to estimate
facility (in particular hospital)  cost functions.  The approach used here, a quan-
titative service delivery  survey  (QSDS),  is distinct  from these other tools  in a
number  of key respects.  First, unlike  most other  survey-based  research  tools,
the service provider  is the key unit of analysis  (as opposed  to, say, the  firm or
the household).  As mentioned  above, it is  not unusual for  household  surveys
to include facility  modules.  The perspective  in  these surveys,  however,  is that
of the household  rather than the service  provider.  Consequently,  while finding
proxies for quality, they pay little attention  to, say, the question of why quality
of and  access  to  services  are  the  way  they  are.  This  is  reflected  in  the type
of data  collected,  which  is  mainly  on  simple  access  indicators  and the  range
of services  offered.  In other words,  these surveys  largely  ignore  provider  be-
havior  and  the  processes  and  complexities  through  which  public spending  is
transformed  into services.  In  most  cases,  facility information  is collected  as  a
part of community questionnaires,  which rely on the knowledge of one  or more
informed individuals  (Frankenberg  2000).  Information  supplied  by informants
is therefore  not  only heavily dependent  on the  perception  of a few individuals
but  also  not  detailed  enough  to form  a basis  for  analysis  of service  delivery,
such  as  operational  efficiency,  utilization,  and  other  performance  indicators.
17To the extent that the information is based on perceptions,  there may be addi-
tional  problems due to the subjective  nature of the data and its sensitivity to
respondents'  expectations.
Second,  the  QSDS  does  not  rely  on  budgeted  costs,  but collects  detailed
data on actual spending and services  provided at the facility  level.
Finally,  the QSDS  explicitly  recognizes  that  agents in the  service delivery
system may have strong incentives to misreport  (or not report)  key data.  These
incentives  derive  from  the  fact that  information  provided  by,  for  example,  a
health  facility  partly  determine  its  entitlement  of public support  or  funding.
Also,  in case  resources  (including  staff time)  are used  for  other purposes  (for
instance  in  the  case  of shirking  and  corruption),  the  agent  involved  in  the
activity  will  most  likely  not report  it truthfully.  Moreover,  certain  types  of
information, such as official charges,  may only partly capture what is intended
to be measured (e.g., the users' costs of the service).  The QSDS deals with these
data issues in  two ways:  (i)  by using  a multi-angular  data collection strategy;
that is, a combination of information from different  sources; and  (ii)  by careful
consideration  of which  sources  and respondents  have  incentives  to  misreport,
and identification  of data sources that  are least  influenced  by these incentives.
The survey data that we use in this paper consists of 155 randomly  selected
primary  health  care  facilities  drawn  from  10  randomly  chosen  districts  in  all
four regions of Uganda.  A detailed description of the sample design is provided
in the appendix.  The sample is restricted to dispensaries  and dispensaries with
maternity  units  (health center  III  level facilities)  in order  to ensure  a degree
of homogeneity  across  facilities.  The sample includes  facilities  from the main
ownership  categories:  government,  private not-for-profit,  and private for-profit.
As  described  earlier,  the private  not-for-profit  health  facilities  in Uganda  are
mostly  operated  by  religious  organizations,  and  in  our  sample  all  non-profits
have religious affiliations.' 3 The sample was designed so that the proportion of
facilities drawn from different  regions and ownership categories  broadly mirrors
the population of facilities.  However,  as noted earlier, no census  of private for-
profit  health facilities is available  in Uganda,  and it is hence difficult  to assess
the extent  to  which the  sample  is representative  in this  regard.'4 Of the  155
facilities, 81  (52%)  are government  owned,  44 (29%)  are owned by not-for-profit
providers, and 30 (19%)  are privately  owned.
The survey applied a data triangulation method, that is, data on the health
13Two of the 44 not-for-profit  providers did not have  a religious affiliation.  These facilities,
however,  drop out of most regressions due to lack of data.
14A sample of government  and private not-for-profit facilities  was drawn randomly  from the
health facility  register  kept by the Ministry  of Health  For-profits  were identified  on the basis
of information  obtained  from  the  sampled  government  facilities  Survey  instruments  and  a
sampling note are available at www.publicspending.org  (tools).
18facilities were collected  both at the district and health facility  level,  as  well  as
from  patients using  an exit  poll.  At  the district  level,  the  district  director  of
health  services  was interviewed  to obtain data on health  infrastructure,  staff,
supervision  arrangements,  and  finance.  Also  at  the district  level,  data were
collected  from the  district records  on each  health  unit  included  in the  survey.
These  data  cover  staffing,  salaries,  vaccine  supply,  immunization,  and drug
supply  to  the  facilities  for  fiscal  year  1999/2000.  In  addition,  data  on  the
number  of outpatients,  inpatients,  and deliveries  were  collected  for  1999/2000
(for  a  detailed  discussion  of the  data  see  Lindelow,  Reinikka,  and  Svensson
2003).
At  the facility  level,  a  broad  range  of  information  relating  to  the  facil-
ity  and  its  activities  was  collected  in the  survey,  including  (i)  characteristics
of the  facility  (location,  type,  level,  ownership,  catchment  area,  organization,
and services);  (ii)  inputs (staff,  drugs, salaries,  vaccines,  medical and  nonmed-
ical consumables,  and  capital inputs);  (iii)  outputs  (facility utilization,  mix of
services,  and  quality);  (iv)  financing  (user  charges,  cost  of service  category,
expenditures,  financial  and  other support);  and  (v)  institutional  support  (su-
pervision,  reporting,  performance  assessment,  and procurement)  for fiscal year
1999/2000.  Also at the facility  level, an exit poll was carried out to interview  10
patients in  each facility.  The latter interview  covered cost  of treatment,  drugs
received,  perceived  quality of services,  and reasons  for selecting  for this facility
instead  of alternative  sources of health  care.
The data collected from both the facility and district level reveals fairly poor
consistency.  While there is no clear pattern overall across  variables, at least for
outpatient  numbers,  there appear  to be  a tendency  for (government)  facilities
to over-report  output statistics  to the districts  relative to the data recorded  in
patient registers.  In some cases the over-reporting is considerable  (see Lindelow,
Reinikka, and Svensson  2003).  In the empirical analysis,  we  therefore use data
obtained  directly  from  the  records kept  by facilities  for  their  own  needs  (i.e,
patient registers, medical records) rather than administrative records submitted
to  local  government.  The  former,  often  available  in  a  highly  disaggregated
format,  was  considered  to  suffer  least from  any  incentive  problems  in  record-
keeping  (see Table A.1 for summary statistics).
6  Empirical results
6.1  Staff remuneration
We start  by looking  at the simple relationship between  staff remuneration and
ownership  (Table  2).  We  have data  for about  900 employees  in  a total of 130
19facilities.  We  have  information  on position,  skill level,  and  pay  but  no other
employee  characteristics.
Regression  1 reports  a  basic  wage  regression,  with  dummy  variables  for
not-for-profit  and  private  for-profit  facilities.  The dependent  variable  is the
full-time  equivalent  salary  plus  lunch  allowances  per  month.15,'6 As evident,
the religious not-for-profit  facilities  pay significantly  less than both the private
for-profit  ones  (F-test)  and  the  government  operated  units  (t-test).  The  pri-
vate  for-profit  facilities  also  pay  significantly  less  than  government  facilities.
On average,  religious  not-for-profits  pay roughly 65,000  Ush per  employee less
per  month  than the government  operated  facilities  and  17,000  Ush  less than
for-profit  facilities.  These  are large  differences,  considering that  the  average
(unconditional) full-time equivalent salary plus allowances per month is 109,000
Ush.  In Regression  1, the district  effects  are  also highly significant  (LR-test).
Facilities in more rural  areas, i.e.,  where the  distance to the closest  subcounty
center  is  greater,  the  pay on  average  is  less,  but  the  effect  is  not  significant.
The market  proxy also enters  insignificantly.
One explanation for the difference in remuneration  is that staff composition
differs across ownership.  If the average skill (education)  level is correlated with
ownership,  and better-educated  workers are  paid more, the  average effect  cap-
tured in Regression  1 may simply be a composition  effect.  To control  for this,
Regressions  2-6  report the findings from subsamples  of the staff.  Regression  2
considers  only  qualified  staff."7 The pattern  is  similar.  Government  facilities
pay the most,  and the religious  not for-profits  pay the least.
Regression  3  shows  wage-setting  conditional  on ownership  for  the highest
qualified staff,  i.e.,  staff with  a least  A-level with subsequent  medical  training.
For this group of workers,  on average the religious not-for-profit  providers pay
60,000 Ush per employee less per month than the government-operated  facilities
" 5In the public sector,  lunch allowance  was supposed to be paid at a rate of 66,000 shilhngs
per month for health care professionals and 44,000 for support staff in 1999/2000 (a conditional
grant to districts).  It was initially  intended as an incentive  for staff to undertake  work in the
community  so  that  they  would  literally  have  money  to  pay  for  their  lunch.  In practice  it
became  a salary supplement  and was a mechanism  for increasing health workers'  pay.  Lunch
allowance  was not  paid to  not-for-profit  staff  which became  a point  of contention  for them
(although  some not-for-profits  pay their own  lunch allowances).  In the  following year,  lunch
allowance  was  formally  rolled up  into  public  sector  salaries  and  is  no  longer  regarded  as  a
separate item.
'6The qualitative  results are similar if we use the more narrow  measure for salary excluding
lunch allowances.
7Qualified  staff include medical  doctor,  clinical officer  (A level  and three  years of medical
training), comprehensive  nurse  (A level and three years of medical  training), registered  nurse
(A level  and two-and-half years  of medical  training),  laboratory  assistant  (O  level and  three
years  of medical training),  and enrolled  nurse and midwife  (O  level and two-and-half years of
medical  training).
20and 56,000  Ush  less than  for-profit  facilities.  There  is  no significant difference
in remuneration  between  for-profit  and  government  providers.  The  average
(unconditional)  full-time equivalent  salary plus  allowances  per month  for  the
highest  qualified staff is  212,000  Ush.  Thus,  on average,  the highest  qualified
staff are  paid 28 percent  less than both for-profit  and government  staff in the
same category.
Regression  4 reports  the results  for the  largest  group  among  the qualified
staff, that is, enrolled  nurses.  While we still observe  a large difference  between
private  and  government  staff  (enrolled  nurses  employed  by  private  providers
receive  65  percent  lower  wages than average),  there  is  no significant  difference
in remuneration  between  for-profit  and not-for-profit  providers.
The same pattern holds  for  unqualified  staff.  Regression  5  depicts  the re-
lationship  between  wages  and  ownership  for  nursing  aides  (the  largest  group
of workers  in the unqualified  group).  Private for-profit  dispensaries  pay  41,000
Ush less  per month  (compared with the government  facilities),  while  the not-
for-profit  providers  on average  pay  49,000  less.  The  coefficient  estimates  are
not significantly  different  at the  10-percent  level.
The preliminary  analysis thus suggests that there exist a religious premium
but only for qualified  staff, which  makes  it possible  for religious  not-for-profit
facilities to hire  qualified workers below  market wage.  This premium does not
show up in the  sample of unqualified  or  less-qualified  staff.  One  explanation
for  this is simply that unqualified  staff are  paid a very  low  salary.  They  may
therefore  not be able to accept a lower wage.
One concern  with these results is that we are missing not only the usual  (in
a wage regression)  unobservables,  but also some standard observables  in deter-
mining  wages,  such as  experience.  Unfortunately,  information  on  experience
was not collected in the survey.  A priori, it is not clear  how this omitted  vari-
able  bias would  influence  the results.  If health staff in the  public  sector  have
longer tenure and thus are more experienced than their counterparts elsewhere,
we  would  overestimate  the religious  (altruistic)  wage  premium.  Conversely,  if
the  not-for-profit  providers'  staff  is  more  experienced,  the reverse  would  be
true.  Fortunately,  what  we  can  do  is to  quantify  how important  this experi-
ence  bias might be,  since we  have  information  on the salary  scale for  medical
personnel in government  health facilities.18 For a qualified  nurse; i.e.,  a nurse
with  at  least  A  level  with  three years  of medical  training,  the  maximum  re-
turns to experience  is 12,000 Ush.  Thus,  in the extreme where qualified staff in
not-for-profit  facilities  have little experience  and qualified  staff in government
and  private for-profit  units  are highly experienced,  this would explain  roughly
'8Salary schedule  B for medical personnel  specifies salaries  for  10 categories  of staff,  with a
range of salaries  for each category  depending on the experience of the respective  staff member
21one-fifth of the difference  in the observed wage differential  between government
(and for-profit)  and not-for-profit  providers.
Regression  6 pools  the staff similarly to Regression 2,  but adds information
on the  level  of medical  training.  The variable  qualificatton takes  the value  0
for  enrolled  nurses  and  midwives,  1 for  laboratory  assistant,  2 for  registered
and comprehensive  nurses, 3 for clinical officers,  and 4 for medical doctors  (see
footnote  8 for details of medical training  in Uganda).  We  allow the ownership
effect  to be conditional  on staff qualifications  by interacting  qualification with
the  ownership  dummies.  As  before,  government  pay  is  higher  than  that  of
both types of private providers.  Not surprisingly, more qualified  staff are gen-
erally better rewarded (positive coefficient  of qualificatwon). However,  there  are
differences  in the marginal return to medical training depending on the owner-
ship of the dispensary  they work  in.  More  specifically,  the marginal return to
medical  training  is lowest  in the government  service  (i.e.,  wages are the most
compressed  in the government  sector)  and highest in the private for-profit  sec-
tor.  Highly qualified  not-for-profit  staff are  paid  significantly  less than their
for-profit  counterparts.  Hence,  the  religious  premium  in pay  falls  largely  on
the most qualified  medical staff.  These effects are illustrated in Figure  1.
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Figure 1:  Salaries  in relation to govermnent  units in for-profit  (thin line)  and not-for-
profit  (thick line)  facilities conditional  on qualification.
226.2  Mix of services
Is there any evidence that the religious not-for-profit  facilities  are different from
the other providers in their choice  of health services?  This is what the altruistic
model suggests.  Or,  are-the  private facilities  providing roughly  the same type
of services,  which  is what  the  perquisites-maximizing  model  predicts.  Before
presenting the results, it is worth  asking:  Why would the offered set of services
differ  across  ownership  types?  Our  starting  point  is  that  the  different  types
of  facilities  have  different  objectives  that  will  show  up  in  different  choice  of
services.  An  alternative  (complementary)  explanation  is that demand  differs,
and if location is  endogenous,  this might lead to systematic service differences.
To some extent,  we control for this by including proxies of location and market
structure  in  the  regressions.  Moreover,  even  if  these  variables  do  not  fully
control  for  differences  in demand,  this  may  not  be  too problematic,  since  we
can  reinterpret  the  model  in  such  a way  that  the  choice  of service  mix  is  in
practice  a choice of where to locate.  For example,  if a facility locates  in a poor
area,  this implies  provision of pro-poor  services.
Tables  3a  and  3b  report  a series  of regression,  where  the  dependent  vari-
able  is  a  0,1  indicator  if a  given  service  is  being  provided  (1),  or  not  (0).19
All  facilities  are  providing  general out-patient  services  (OPD).  From  Table 3,
it is  possible  to  identify  two  broad  sets  of services.  The  first  group  includes
in-patients  care,  medical care,  laboratory  services,  and immunization.20 The
religious not-for-profit  and the private  for-profit providers  are  as  likely to pro-
vide these  services.  For medical  care,  all  three facility types are similar,  while
government  facilities  are  significantly less likely to provide  laboratory services.
Our  empirical  evidence  shows  that  government  units  are  the  most  likely
ones to carry  out immunizations,  followed  by the religious  not-for-profit  facil-
ities.  However,  this  effect  is  solely  driven  by  differences  in  vaccine  supply.2'
Controlling  for  the free  supply of vaccines  in Regression  5,  we find  no signifi-
cant difference between the three types of facilities.  This is also consistent with
the principles  of the national  (vertical)  immunization  program.
For the second set of services,  the two private  sector providers  differ.  This
19We focus on the most common health services.  A handful of facilities also  provide mental
care,  eye  care,  and dental care.
20The term  "medical care"  refers to (non-surgical)  curative  care
2tImmunization  is a special  service from  the  individual facility  perspective  The  national
immunization  program  (UNEPI)  sets  countywide  standards  for  immunization  services  and
manages  the  program mainly  by  providing  supplies  to health  facilities.  In fact  UNEPI  is  a
monopoly  supplier of vaccines in Uganda  (both regular  supplies and  for immunization  days).
The  program  sets  its targets  for  immunization  based  on  population  and  provides  vaccines
to meet  those  targets  directly  to  the  facilities  Not-for-profit  dispensaries  also  receive  their
vaccines from  UNEPI  as do  some private for-profit  providers.
23set  includes  outreach,  health  education,  training  of  nurses  and  community
health  workers,  antenatal  care,  and  family  planning.  All  these  services,  ex-
cept  family planning,  are more likely to be provided  by the not-for-profit than
the for-profit  facilities.  Not-for-profit  facilities  are  less  likely  to provide  fam-
ily  planning.  Comparing the not-for-profit  and  government  facilities,  the later
is  more  likely  to carry out  outreach  (almost  all  did,  77  out of 80),  although
the  religious  not-for-profit  and government  facilities  are  similar  in number of
staff days per month  for outreach  (Regression  7).  The religious  not-for-profit
facilities  are more likely to run training  programs for community  health work-
ers, while government  clinics are more likely to provide antenatal  care, but the
effect  is small.
How  do we interpret  these results?  Clearly, the services  depicted  in Table
3  differ  both  in  their  profit  potential,  the  extent  to  which  they  benefit  the
poor,  and  in  their  public  good  nature.  In  general,  in-patient  care,  medical
care, antenatal  care,  and laboratory testing are services  that are demanded  by
a broad spectrum  of the  population  and  are not typically public  goods.  Most
of these  services  are just  as likely to be  provided by  for-profit facilities  as the
religious  not-for-profit  ones, antenatal  care being  an exception.
It could be argued that outreach is a service that in general has a bias toward
the poor.  Fewer not-for-profits provide this service compared to government but
those that do provide  more of it.  Health education and training of community
health  workers  have  a  public  good  element.  Therefore  it may  be difficult  to
make  a positive  profit from  these three services.  The perquisites-maximizing
model  predicts  that such services would  not be  provided  neither  by for-profit
nor by  not-for-profit  facilities.  The data does  not support this prediction.  In
fact, the pro-poor services  (outreach)  and those with a public good element are
significantly  more likely to be provided  by the religious  not-for-profit  facilities
than the for-profit  ones.
As can be seen from Table 3, family  planning in  an exception.  A probable
explanation for this is that the not-for-profit  facilities have religious motivations
for  not  providing this  type of service,  particularly  as the  Catholic  Church  is
important  as a health care  provider.
It is worth noting that one service,  laboratory  testing,  is the only one that
both private  providers  are  significantly  more  likely to provide.  To the extent
that testing is an important quality component,  this is in line with findings on
the quality of care  reported below.
246.3  Price setting
Table 4 reports  on the relationship  between user-fees  and ownership.  Again, it
is useful to ask:  Why would prices differ across ownership  types?  In our model,
facilities  act  as  local  monopolists,  setting  prices  to  maximize  their  objective
function.  If these  objectives  differ  across  ownership,  we  should  also  observe
differences  in user-fees  across types.
Another  explanation  is that  what  we  treat  as  homogeneous  goods  (e.g.,
minor  surgery)  are  actually  differentiated  goods  with respect  to  quality.  The
implications  of this is  analyzed formally in section  3.3.
Another  obvious  explanation  is differences  in demand  and marginal  costs
across units.  Wealthier  areas may  be  willing to pay  more for  health  services.
It may therefore  be more profitable to locate  in such an area,  which may have
differential impact  on the locality choice of the providers.  As discussed  above,
we can reinterpret  the model so that the choice  of prices in practice is  a choice
of where to locate.  Thus, for evaluating the behavior  of not-for-profit  facilities,
this may pose less of a problem.  In addition,  we control for location and degree
of competition.
Table  4 shows that there are  large differences  across types of facilities.  For
general  OPD,  the government  facilities  charge  almost  2,000  Ush  less  per  first
visit compared to private  for-profit  providers.  The median  payment  in  a gov-
ernment facility  is 500 Ush.  The religious  not-for-profit  facilities  charge signif-
icantly more than the government  facilities,  but significantly less  (roughly  600
Ush)  than the for-profit  facilities.  A  similar pattern matches  user  fees for  the
other services,  as can be seen  from Regressions  2-5.  Private  providers  charge
more for minor  surgery, antenatal  care, medical care,  and delivery-related  ser-
vices.  With the exception  of antenatal care, the for-profit  facilities charge more
than the religious not-for-profit,  ranging from around 600 Ush for minor surgery
to 5,000 Ush  for delivery.
The  baseline  model  suggests  that  a perquisites-maximizing  not-for-profit
facility will set the same prices as a for-profit  facility,  while the altruistic model
suggests that the not-for-profit  will  set prices  at  which  the marginal  return  is
strictly lower than the marginal cost.  In other words, an altruistic not-for-profit
facility  will charge strictly lower  prices than a for-profit  unit.  The findings  on
user-fee  charges are  consistent with the altruistic model.
6.4  Quality
In the model, a for-profit facility would choose to exert higher effort (ex ante) to
increase  quality than  a perquisites  maximizing  not-for-profit  facility.  Without
25further  restrictions,  we cannot  say if an altruistic  clinic would choose  to exert
more or less effort  than a for-profit  one.  We  can, however,  draw the conclusion
that if quality of services is the same or higher in the not-for-profit  sector than
in  the  for-profit  sector,  this  is  inconsistent  with  the perquisites-maximizing
model.
Measuring  quality  is  difficult.  We  provide  four complementary  measures.
The first measure is based on observed treatment practice.  The second measure
is based on observed supply (that is, availability  of health infrastructure).  The
third captures prescription practices,  while the last one is a qualitative indicator
derived  from the exit poll data.
One important component in prescribing the correct  treatment  for malaria
and intestinal worm cases  is laboratory testing.  We have information  on these
two  types  of test.  The number  of malaria blood  slides  carried out  (for  every
100 suspected  malaria patients),  and the number of stool tests undertaken  (for
every  100 suspected  intestinal worm cases).  Table  5 reports  the findings  with
respect  to testing.  In line with the finding on laboratory  services,  we  find that
the private  providers  are  significantly  more  likely  to test patients  for  malaria
and intestinal  worms.  The effect is large.  For example, on average,  the private
providers  test  25  more  patients  of every  100 suspected  malaria patients.  It is
interesting  to note that this is not due to differences  in health equipment  and
staff (regressions  2 and 4).  Adding these additional controls do not change  the
results  regarding  ownership.  Having  highly  qualified  staff and  a  microscope
increase  the frequency  of testing,  however.
Table 6 reports the result on health infrastructure.  Government facilities  are
more likely than private for-profit facilities to have sterilization and refrigeration
equipment, and more likely than not-for-profit  facilities to have a blood pressure
machine.  It is  interesting  to note that private  for-profit  facilities  are as  likely
to have observable health equipment  (inputs);  that is,  equipment that is  being
used in the actual treatment  process (such as protective clothes,  blood pressure
equipment),  while they are less likely to have equipment  that is  more  difficult
to observe  (like sterilization equipment  and refrigerators).  One explanation  for
this is that the private for-profit clinics are more responsive to profits,  and thus
have stronger incentives to cut costs and pursue nonverifiable quality reductions
on the service(s)  being provided.
Table  7 depicts the findings on another treatment variable, the prescription
of antibiotics.  The extent to which antibiotics  are prescribed  is  generally very
high.  In fact, almost half of the patients report receiving an antibiotic.  In some
cases,  they  receive  several  types  at the same time.  Government  facilities  are
significantly more  likely to provide  antibiotics than private  providers.  Regres-
sion  2  indicates  that  the  effect  is  particularly  strong  in  government  facilities
26without  qualified  (medical)  staff.  One  explanation  for  this  finding,  which  is
consistent  with  the altruistic hypothesis,  is that antibiotics  is  a substitute  for
effort.22
The last finding on  quality comes  from  exit polls  on why  the patient  had
chosen to visit  the  facility where  she was  interviewed.  Patients  reported  that
proximity  and good treatment and/or good staff were the most important fac-
tors  for selecting  the facility.  Proximity is the most  important  factor  overall;
this is particularly  true for government  facilities.  In contrast,  patients  are sig-
nificantly  more  likely to report  good treatment  and/or  good staff as  a reason
for visiting private facilities  (Table 7, Regression  3).  Not surprisingly, facilities
without qualified staff are less likely to be visited for quality reasons (Regression
4).
The results on quality indicate that for observable outcomes, private providers
appear to provide  better quality care.  We cannot  distinguish between  the pri-
vate for-profit  and the not-for-profit  providers.  These  findings  are inconsistent
with the perquisites-maximizing  hypothesis.
7  -The effects  of financial aid
A key question in a cross-section framework such as (17)  is whether the selection-
on-observables assumption is plausible.  Specifically,  there might be unobserved
variables that  are related to both  y and  the ownership  indicators.  Our second
approach  avoids  this problem  by exploiting  a near natural experiment  of gov-
ernment financial  aid for the not-for-profit  sector.
As discussed  in section  2.3,  the financial  aid prograim  for  dispensaries  was
initiated  by  the  government  of Uganda  in  the  financial  year  1999/2000  and
prescribed that each not-for-profit  unit was to receive a fixed-amount grant for
the  fiscal year.  The program was implemented  by the local  governments  (dis-
tricts).  Specifically,  the Ministry  of Finance  transferred  the  funds  meant  for
lower-level  units operated by not-for-profits to the local governments (districts),
who in turn distributed the funds to the units concerned once they had submit-
ted  a workplan.  In  theory,  all not-for-profit  facilities  should have received  the
funds  in  1999/2000.  In practice,  however,  there was variation  in receipts  due
to a number  of idiosyncratic  factors,  including  not-for-profit  dispensaries  not
submitting  the necessary  documentation  in time, uncertainty  about what  the
grants  could be  used  for  (it  was  meant  to be  an untied grant),  and generally
poor communications.  As the system of providing financial aid for not-for-profit
22In  addition,  the  cost  of prescribing  drugs  is much  lower  in  government  facilities,  since
they receive  most of their  drugs for  free.
27units was new, this pattern was not surprising.  The outcome for the fiscal year
1999/2000 was that some units did not receive their entitlement.  Instead their
first grant reached them the following  financial year.  Thus, de facto the grant
program was phased in.  It is this variation  in receipt over time that we exploit.
A possible objection to this approach is that the de facto phasing-in was not
random, or more specifically  that the incidence  of receipts could be correlated
with the error term in equation  (17).  In that case, correlation between transfers
and outcomes may be spurious.  Although we cannot empirically fully reject this
alternative hypothesis (since there might be unobserved factors influencing both
transfer and y),  we can check if the groups of grant  recipients and nonrecipients
differ  on observables.
Tables 8a and 8b report a set of regressions using observable facility charac-
teristics as dependent  variables.  The regressor  is  a dummy variable  taking the
value  1 if the facility  received  the entitled grant,  and 0  otherwise.  Regressions
1 and  2 show that grant recipients  and nonrecipients do not differ significantly
in age, measured  either as the year the facility was  established  (Regression  1),
when  the  facility  has  been  renovated  last  (year),  or  whether  the  facility  had
been renovated  (Regression 2).23  The recipients  and nonrecipients do not differ
in access to communication  infrastructure  (Regression  3),  that is,  a nonrecipi-
ent is as  likely as a grant recipient  to have access to telephone,  newspapers,  and
radio  at the facility.  We  also do not find any difference  in distance to district
or  subcounty headquarters  (Regression  4),  size of the  facility  (Regression  5),
whether  or  not the  facility  was  staffed  with  at  least  one qualified  nurse  or  a
doctor  (Regression  6),  or in  access  to health infrastructure  (Regression  7-10).
Thus,  there  is  no  (observable)  evidence  suggesting  that  the  grant  recipients
and nonrecipients  differ on observable characteristics  (apart from receiving the
transfer or not).2 4
The reason  we  use the variation  in grant  receipt  to identify  the  effects  of
ownership  is that  a profit or  a perquisites-maximizing  not-for-profit  provider's
behavior  would not be affected by the inflow of aid.  Untied  aid does not affect
the marginal  cost or revenue schedules.  Thus, it would set the same prices and
provide  the same services  as without  aid.
The altruistic not-for-profit facility's maximization  program would however
23The variable  established/renovated  depicts  for each  facility the year  the facility  was last
renovated,  or  if no renovation  has occurred,  the year the facility  was established.
24Although the groups of facilities  do not differ in observables,  they may still differ in some
unobserved  dimension.  However, this unobserved  dimension  must then be uncorrelated  with
the set of observable  characteristics  reported in  Table 7.
28be affected.  Formally,  with aid, the facility  maximizes,
SI  5.
L =  Z  Ex  + A  a + L  [P(x8, q)x,-w  -cx.  - C(q))
where  a  is  financial  support.  As  shown  in  the  appendix,  for  an  altruistic
provider,  aid will lead to lower prices  (and possibly more services)  and to higher
quality  care.  These  results  are  intuitive.  The  altruistic  provider  cares  about
the number  of (poor)  people  treated and this number  can  be  increased  by ei-
ther lowering prices or increasing  the quality of care.  Both strategies are costly.
Aid relaxes the provider's  budget constraint and at the margin it is optimal to
increase the the number  of people treated using both strategies.
It is worth noting that government units also receive financial  aid, primarily
from public  sources,  although  not from the  same  financial  aid program.  The
allocation criteria and disbursement  mechanism for aid to the government units
are  not clear.  On the one hand, some local  governments  may use financial aid
to improve service  delivery.  On the other hand,  as most government  programs
executed  at  the  local  (district  and  subcountry)  level,  it  is  likely  that  well-
organized  facilities  in more  affluent  (and  politically  powerful)  areas  are  likely
to capture  a larger  share  of this  funding  (for  capture  of education grants  see
Reinikka and  Svensson  2002).
While most government  and religious  not-for-profit  facilities  receive  finan-
cial aid  from  public sources,  no for-profit  facility did.25 Conditional on receiv-
ing financial  assistance,  the median receipt for not-for-profit dispensaries  (with
maternity unit)  was 3.2 million Ugandan  shillings (Ush),  which  is close to the
amount  allocated  and disbursed  by the central  government  (3.4  million  Ush).
Roughly  25  percent of the not-for-profit  facilities  did not receive  financial  aid.
Sixty-seven  percent  of the government  facilities  received  public  financial  sup-
port.  Conditional on receiving financial aid, the mean receipt in the government
sector was 0.6 million  Ush.
When evaluating the effects of financial aid, it is important to identify which
potential variables might be affected by the inflow in a short time interval.  We
look at three sets of variables  that facilities can easily  adjust  in the short run:
testing procedures,  prices,  and  staff remuneration.
In Table 9, Regressions  1 and 2, report the correlation  between financial aid
and  laboratory  testing.  Financial  aid is  positively  correlated  with  testing for
malaria and intestinal worms.  The estimated  effects  are large.  A not-for-profit
provider  with  the median  grant  receipt  test on  average  24  more  patients  out
25Dropping  two  suspected  misrecorded  observations,  we  have  data from  152  of the  155
sample facilities.
29of every  100 suspected  malaria case.  The relationship,  however,  only holds for
religious  not-for-profit  facilities.
When we  test the  relationship  between  user  fees  and  financial  aid  for  the
specific services  we have information on  (minor surgery,  antenatal care, medical
care,  and  delivery  services),  we  find  no impact  of financial  aid.  However,  as
depicted  in Regression  3,  financial  aid is  negatively  correlated  with  OPD  user
charges.  This  conditional  finding  again  only  holds  for  religious  not-for-profit
facilities.  A  not-for-profit  provider  with the median  grant  receipt  charge,  on
average,  900  Ush less  for general  OPD. As the  median  number of outpatients
treated  for this subsample  of facilities  was  230 patients  per month,  the upper
bound on the  foregone  revenues  of this price  cut is  2.4 million Ush,  or  three-
quarters of the total grant.26
Finally,  we  analyzed  the relationship  between  salaries  and  financial  aid.
There  is no robust relationship  in  any staff category  (we report the  results  for
qualified staff and nursing aides only).
To summarize,  we find evidence  that financiai  aid  leads to more  testing of
suspected malaria and intestinal worm cases and lower prices for OPD services,
but  only  in  religious  not-for-profit  facilities.  Since  the  variation  in  financial
assistance  is,  we  argue,  to a  large  extent  exogenous,  these  findings  provide
strong evidence  in support of the altruistic hypothesis.
$  (Concluding remarks
In this paper  we exploit  a unique micro-level  data set on  primary health care
facilities  in Uganda to explore the motivation  of religious  not-for-profit health
care providers.  We  develop  a simple  model  to  guide  the empirical  work.  To
identify whether working for a (religious) not-for-profit has an effect,  we use two
strategies.  The first builds on the assumption that we can identify the behavior
of the not-for-profit  providers  by comparing  their  performance  in  various  di-
mensions with government  and for-profit  providers.  The second approach relies
on a near natural policy experiment  of public financial aid for the not-for-profit
sector.
In the cross section,  we find that religious not-for-profit  facilities  hire quali-
fied medical staff below the market  wage.  They pay significantly less than both
the private for-profit  sector and the government.  The finding that the govern-
26That  is 900*230*12  = 2.4 million Ush.  This  is the upper bound since  the price cut most
likely increased  the  number  of patients  treated  In addition,  we  do  not have  information  on
when during  the  year  the  price cut  occurred.  For example,  if the  price cut  occurred  in the
middle of the year,  the foregone  revenues should  be half as  large.
30ment pays  the highest salaries  is quite  surprising,  as the commonly  held view
in Uganda is  that public sector  pay  is  well below  the private sector,  including
the health care profession.  For example,  a major pay comparator study,  which
underpins the government  pay  reform, puts the pay of a clinical officer  and an
enrolled  nurse employed  by government  at 20-40  percent of that in the  private
sector  (Republic  of Uganda  1999).  Our findings  are  in stark contrast  to this
commonly held  view,  at least  in the case of lower-level  health  care units.
Moreover,  religious  not-for-profit  facilities  are  more  likely  to provide  pro-
poor services  and services  with  a public good  element,  and charge lower prices
for  services than  for-profit  units.  Private  not-for-profit  and  for-profit  facilities
both provide better quality care than their government counterparts,  although
government  facilities  have better equipment.
Finally, the quasi-experiment  reveals that financial aid leads to more testing
of suspected  malaria  and  intestinal  worm  cases,  and  hence  to  better  quality
of  care,  and  lower  prices  in  religious-not-for-profit  facilities.  Moreover,  the
estimated effects  are substantial.
These  findings  are consistent  with the  existence  of a premium  in  working
in a religious not-for-profit  facility and that religious  not-for-profits  are  driven
(partly)  by  altruistic  concerns.
It is worth pointing out what we  have not measured  and other possible  ex-
planations  for the  pattern we  observe.  First,  we interpret  the  evidence  above
in  favor  of  the  altruistic  model.  However,  as  argued  by  Glaeser  (2002),  it
may  still  be  the  case  that  the not-for-profit  providers  are  captured  by  their
workers/managers,  but that their preferences  themselves  are also  altruistic and
therefore  they  (partly)  internalize  the  stated  goals  of the provider.  There  is
some qualitative  evidence  to support this interpretation,  as many  practitioners
in the  field  report  that the working  environment  in religious  not-for-profit  fa-
cilities  are considerably  better  (i.e.,  revenues  are spent  on perks that improve
the  working  environment  for  the staff).  This in  turn  could  also  help  explain
why  salaries  in  not-for-profits  are  lower  (i.e.,  compensated  by  perks).  On the
other  hand,  there  are  reports  that  labor  practices  in  religious  not-for-profits
are not always ideal-  dismissing single pregnant  workers,  compulsory religious
activities-and  that these policies can  be resented by the workers.
Second, since all the not-for-profits in our sample have religious affiliations,
it is  possible  that  the  objective  is not  pure  altruism,  but  to  convert  people.
The  provision  of services  and  the  service  delivery  choices  may  therefore  be
guided by this goal.  Distinguishing between these  two objectives would require
data on nonreligious  not-for-profit  providers  and a model  of a health provider
maximizing the number of people converted  (for example by maximizing  public
relations).  Clearly,  this  is an important  area for future  research.
31Third,  it  is  possible  to  think  of alternative  explanations  for  each individ-
ual  finding reported  above.  For example,  the religious  wage premium  may  be
due  to  rigidities  in  the  labor market  combined  with  recent  increases  in  the
pay  for  government  employees.  On the  other  hand,  paid  training  (where  a
per  diem  typically  makes  up  a significant  part  of the  monthly wage)  is  more
prevalent in the public  sector,  which  suggest that what  we  pick  up is  a lower
bound.  Also,  this effect  cannot  explain  the wage  differential  between  private
for-profit  and not-for-profit  providers.  If the type of workers (within a category
of workers, say, nurses) differs across ownership types, this may also explain the
wage differential.  In particular,  if workers  in the not-for-profit  sector  are less
competent  health  care  providers,  this may  explain  why  they  are  paid  signifi-
cantly  less.  However,  this interpretation  is  difficult  to reconcile  with  the fact
that not-for-profit  facilities  provide  better quality care than their government
counterparts.
An alternative  explanation  for the financial  aid findings is that better-run,
well-organized,  not-for-profit  providers  managed to get the financial aid sooner
than poorly functioning ones.  But if these well-organized  units  also pay higher
wages,  we should  observe a positive relationship  between  monthly  salaries  and
aid.  We do not.  In addition,  on observables,  the  early  and late aid recipients
look similar.  We believe the strength of the argument put forward in the paper
lies in the fact that we find consistent evidence across different aspects of service
delivery  (price and wage setting,  service  mix,  and quality  choices)  and  across
empirical techniques.  We cannot think of one particular alternative explanation
that would explain  all these facts.
329  Appendix
9.1  Sample  design
The sample design  was  governed  by three principles.  First, attention  was  re-
stricted to dispensaries and dispensaries with maternity units (i.e., health center
III) to ensure a degree of homogeneity across sampled facilities.  Second, subject
to security  constraints,  the sample was  meant  to capture  regional  differences.
Finally,  the  sample  had  to  include  facilities  from  the  main  ownership  cate-
gories:  government,  private nonprofit  (churches,  NGOs),  and private for-profit
providers.  These three  considerations  lead  us to  choose  a  stratified  random
sample.  The sample was based on the Ministry of Health (MOH)  facility regis-
ter for  1999.  The register includes  government,  private  non-profit,  and private
for-profit  facilities, but is known to be inaccurate  with respect to the latter two.
A  total of 155 health  facilities  were  surveyed.  On the basis  of existing  infor-
mation, it was decided that the sample would include 81  government  facilities,
44 private non-for-profit  facilities,  and  30 private for-profit  facilities.  The  exit
poll of clients covered  1,617 individuals.  The field work was carried  out during
October  to December  2000.  For summary statistics see Table A.1.
As  a  first  step in the  sampling  process,  8 districts  (out  of 45)  had  to be
dropped from the sample frame due to security concerns.27 From the remaining
districts,  10  districts,  stratified  according  to  geographical  location  with  the
size distribution  determined  by population  shares,  were  randomly  sampled  in
proportion  to district  population  size.  Thus,  three  districts  were chosen  from
the  Eastern  and  Central  regions,  and  two  from  the  Western  and  Northern
regions.28
From the selected  districts, a sample of government  and private non-profit
facilities  was drawn randomly from the MOH register.  A reserve  list of replace-
ment facilities  was also drawn from the sample frame.  Due to the unreliability
of the register for private for-profit  facilities,  it was decided that for-profit  facil-
ities would be identified on the basis  of information from the government  facil-
ities sampled.29 The administrative records for facilities  in the original sample
were reviewed  first at the district  headquarters,  where some facilities  that did
not meet selection criteria and data collection  requirements were dropped from
27The  eight districts  were Bundibugyo,  Gulu, Kabaxole,  Kasese,  Kibaale,  Kitgum,  Kotido,
and Moroto
28The study districts were Mpigi,  Mukono and Masaka  in the Central region; Mbale,  Iganga
and Soroti in the East; Arua and Apac in the North; and Mbarara  and Bushenyi  in the West
29Specifically,  the x  private facilities  in  region  y would  be  determined  by  the in-charge  in
the first  x randomly  drawn government  facilities  in region  y,  where each  in-charge  would be
asked to identify the closest  private dispensary  or dispensary  with  maternity  unit.
33the sample.  These were  replaced by facilities  from the  reserve  list.  Overall  30
facilities  were replaced.
9.2  Proof of claim in  section  3.5
The claim in section  3.5 is that a for-profit  facility provides  higher quality care
and charges  higher prices than a perquisites-maximizing  facility.  Without loss
of  generality,  consider  the  case  of  one  service.  We  then  want  to show  that
P  F=dp/dce > 0 and  Qa  =_  dq/dce > 0.  It is  analytically  more  convenient  to
let  the facility  choose  quantity and  quality  instead of price  and quality  (both
approaches  are  equivalent).  Thus,  demand  is x  = X(p, q).  To prove  the claim
let F(p, q; ca)  and G(p, q; a)  denote the first-order  conditions  for optimal  price
and quality  (corresponding  to (12)  and (2)),
F(q,  x; a)  = o (x + (p-c)  Xp(p,  q))  = 0  (18)
G(q, x; ce)  = a (pXq(p, q)  - cXq(p, q) - CO)  - 'Yq  0  (19)
Total differentiate  F  and G yields,
FpPoa + FqQa + F, =0  (20)
GpPa.+GqQo,+G.=0  (21)
where  Fx = dF/dx. Thus,
P,  =FqG, > 0  (22)
Qa  FpG,  > 0  (23)
since  Fq = a (Xq  + (p - c)Xpq)  >  0,  G:x  = -yq/O  > 0 (from  (19))  and,  by the
second order conditions,  A > 0,  Fp < 0.
9.3  Proof of clarim  in  section  7
The claim in section  7  is that  aid to  an altruistic  not-for-profit  provider leads
to higher-quality  care and lower  prices.  Without loss of generality, consider the
case of one service  and assume  y(q)  = 0 Vq.  We want to show that Pa < 0 and
Qa  >  0.  The  facility's  problem  can  be restated  as  maximizing  the Lagrange
function,
L = X(p, q) + A (a +pX(p, q) -w-cX(p,  q) -C(q)).
34Let  F(A, p, q; a), G(A, p,  q; a)  and  H(A, p, q; a)  denote the  first-order  condi-
tions for  A,  p and q,  respectively.
F(A,p, q; a) = a + pX(p, q) -w-cX(p, q) -C(q) =  0  (24)
G(A, p, q; a) = Xp(p, q) + A (X(p, q) + (p - c)Xp(p, q)) = 0  (25)
H(A, p, q; a) = Xq(p, q)  + A ((p -c)Xq(p,  q)  - Cq)  = 0.  (26)
The second-order  condition  for  a constrained  optimum  is
A _  Fq [FpGq - FqGpJ + Fp [GqFq - FpHq] > 0.  (27)
Since  Fq = -Xq/A  < 0 (from  (26))  and  Fp = -Xp/A  >  0  (from  (25)),  a
sufficient  condition  for an  optimum is that the first  term in brackets in  (27)  is
negative  and the second  term is positive.  By the implicit  function  theorem  we
have,
P.  [GqFq-FpHq] < 0  (28)
Qa.  [FpGq-FqGp]  > 0  (29)
where  it  follows  from  (27)  that the term  in  brackets  in  (28)  is positive  while
the term  in brackets  in  (29)  is  negative.
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37TWabRle  AA1  Summary  statistics
Sample variable  All  Government  Not-for-profit  For-profit
No. staff  7.0  7.8  7.6  4.0
7.0  7.0  6.0  3.0
3.8  3.2  4.6  2.7
No. doctors, clinical  0.6  0.7  0.3  0.7
officer  0  1.0  0  0
0.69  0.55  0.6  1.0
No. nurses  1.7  2.0  1.7  1.1
1.0  2.0  1.0  1.0
1.6  1.5  1.9  1.0
Established or last  1993  1993  1992  1993
renovated  1996  1995  1998  1998
12  8.9  10.7  20.2
Distance to District  32  36  28  26.0
H[Q (kcm)
29  35  22  22.0
22.5  21.6  25.5  18.6
Distance to
subcounty HQ (Im)  3.9  3.8  4.5  3.5
3.0  2.0  3.0  3.0
Competition  4.1  4.4  3.9  3.8
(number of other  1.7  1.2  1.8  3.2
health-care
providers)  1.0  1.0  1.0  2.0
No. outpatients per  2.0  1.3  1.7  3.0
month  419  500  346  270
358  474  252  204
Sample size  296  284  283  279
155  81  44  30
Note: Mean, median,  and standard deviation reported in subsequent rows for each variable. Sample size is maximum
number of observations. Because of missing data, not al  variables  have maximum number of observations.
38Table 1. Testable implications
Model specification  Perquisites maximizing  Altruistic
AVkP  =  l.FP  fl/P  >FP
Basic model  /,P  = flFP  AVP  <  ,FP
fliNP =  flFP  AV  <  flFP
f13kP  >  flFP
Endogenous costs  /3kP  > /3FP  /lNP  </p3,
flNP  >  8lFP  flP  <  fiFP
1kNP  <  fiFP  /k  P  >  /P
Endogenous quality  /3P  </;P
3f9F  flZP  <  pFP
iNP  <  flFP
391121  bie 2. Remuneration
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
High
Qualified  qualified  Enrolled  Nursing  Qualified
Sample  Full  staff  staff  nurses  aides  staff
Dep. variable  Full-time equiv. Salary + lunch allowances per staff and month
NFP  -65,046°°  -95,493°°°  -59,914°°°  -102,213"'  -48,792"'  -109,647..
(5,709)  (8,467)  (24,326)  (6,178)  (3,780)  (8,700)
FP  -47,949°°  -60,191°°°  -3,471  -105,919"'  -40,883  -120,762"'
(9,182)  (12,943)  (28,457)  (10,749)  (6,580)  (15,001)
distance  -808  1183  2,021  1,506"  -1,788$  1,677"
(563)  (831)  (2,190)  (621)  (1,063)  (737)
competition  1,495  -653  512  -2,582  -219  -964







F (NFP=FP)  3.16*  6.81  3.190  0.11  1.28
[.076]  (.009)  (.078)  (.740)  (.259)
District effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
LR  98.2  31.2  13.5  32.6  128.9  40.1
(.000)  [.000]  (.142)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Facilities  138  116  70  100  117  116
Observations  848  288  84  204  259  288
Adj. R2  0.74  0.90  0.88  0.95  0.93  0.93
Notes:  OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by facility in parenthesis.
(**)  [00°] denotes  significance at the 1  (5) [10] percent level.
F is F-test statistic for testing the null hypothesis that NFP=FP.
LR is likelihood ratio test statistic for testing the null hypothesis that all district effects equal.
40Table 3a. Service provision
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Staff days
per month
In-patients  Medical  Lab.  Immuni-  Inmuni-  for
Dep. variable  care  care  services  zation  zation  Outreach  outreach
NFP  0.262***  0.068  0.387*  -0.167*  -0.001  -0.126**  -1.111
(.081)  (.044)  (.085)  (.057)  (.033)  (.062)  (1.260)
PP  0.104  0.018  0.378***  -0.687***  -0.029  -0.823***  -5.830"'
(.111)  (.065)  (.101)  (.091)  (.028)  (.066)  (.936)
Distance  -0.005  0.001  -0.015*  0.005  -0.003  -0.001  0.035
(.009)  (.004)  (.009)  (.006)  (.002)  (.006)  (0.178)
competition  0.001  0.010  -0.005  0.005  0.025  0.006  0.043
(0.021)  (.008)  (.017)  (.020)  (.017)  (.020)  (.199)
free supply of  0.968"  16.5
vaccinations  (.033)  (.000)
F (NFP=PP)  1.86  0.76  0.01  26.6  1.15  67.5
(.175)  (.386)  (.938)  (.000)  (.285)  (.000)
District  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
effects
LR  29.1  11.8  23.4  34.4  11.0  23.0  18.3
(.001)  (.225)  (.005)  (.000)  (.273)  (.006)  (.031)
Facilities  152  154  153  151  151  153  151
Adj. R2  0.71  0.94  0.52  0.90  0.99  0.90  0.41
Notes: OLS regressions  with robust standard errors in parentheses.
* (**)  [***] denotes significance at the 10 (5)  [1] percent level.
F is F-test statistic for testing the null hypothesis that NFP=PP.
LR is likelihood ratio test statistic for testing null hypothesis that all district effects equal.
41TabRe 3b.  Service provision
Regression  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Dep. variable  Health  Training of  Training of  Antenatal care  Family
education  nurses  health workers  planning
NFP  -0.037  -0.002  0.116  -0.096  -0.360*
(.024)  (.080)  (.083)  (.054)  (.079)
PP  -0.256*  -0.238c*Q  -0.196*  -0.2840  -0.049
(.078)  (.090)  (.059)  (.073)  (.074)
Distance  0.007  -0.006  -0.003  0.003  0.007
(.003)  (.008)  (.007)  (.004)  (.012)
competition  0.019  0.030  -0.009  0.016  0.001
(.009)  (.021)  (.018)  (.008)  (.012)
F (NFP=PP)  7.9  5.1  12.5  4.9  9.6
(.006)  (.024)  (.000)  (.028)  (.002)
District effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
LR  20.0  48.8  24.3  28.9  13.9
(.018)  (.000)  (.004)  (.001)  (.126)
Facilities  153  154  152  152  152
j. R2  0.96  0.47  0.31  0.93  0.88
See notes to table 3a.
42Table 4. User fee charges
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Dep. varnable  OPD  Mmor surgery  Antenatal care  Medical care  Delivery
NFP  1,309*  950  388  2,106**  3,587***
(184)  (290)  (87)  (355)  (734)
FP  1,930*  1,598*  471  3,103*  8,566*
(223)  (351)  (123)  (460)  (983)
distance  0.25  -61.1  9.02  -7.05  -44.3
(43.6)  (29.2)  (8.66)  (37.1)  (74.9)
competition  -12.8  109.0  10.0  -58.5  -345*
(19.1)  (97.5)  (20.2)  (76.0)  (155)
F (NFP=FP)  6.73w  2.78*  0.38  4.28  20.3
(.011)  (.100)  (.539)  (.042)  (.000)
District effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
LR  39.8  32.6  22.9  24.6  42.6
(.000)  (.000)  (.006)  (.003)  (.000)
Facilities  130  80  99  94  87
Adj. R2  0.79  0.70  0.83  0.70  0.83
Notes:  See notes to table 3.
43aIblle  . Qality - testing
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dep. variable  Blood slides  Blood slides  Stool tests  made  Stool tests  made
NFP  25.5  27.7  19.0  20.9 
(5.71)  (5.30)  (4.74)  (4.73)
FP  25.2  28.4  15.9  18.9 
(6.50)  (6.21)  (5.30)  (5.32)
distance  0.13  -0.18
(.540)  (0.45)
competition  -0.20  -0.40
(1.23)  (1.04)
microscope  22.8  16.4'
(5.13)  (4.50)
high qualified  20.1  13.7 
staff  (5.25)  (4.59)
F (NFP=FP)  0.00  0.01  0.27  0.13
(.958)  (.917)  (.605)  (.723)
District effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
LR  28.5  10.5  37.1  29.5
(.000)  (.314)  (.000)  (.000)
Facilities  155  153  149  149
Adj.  R2  0.42  0.57  0.39  0.51
Notes:  See notes to table 3.
44Table 6. Quality - access to health infiastructure provision
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Sterilization  Blood pressure  Protective
Dep. variable  equipment  Refrigerator  equipment  Microscope  clothes
NFP  0.004  -0.241***  -0.044  0.147  0.019
(.012)  (.080)  (.065)  (.089)  (.086)
FP  -0.170*  -0.719*9  0.112*  0.011  -0.043
(.069)  (.084)  (.045)  (.111)  (.108)
distance  -0.004  0.008  -0.005  -0.016  0.004
(.004)  (.006)  (.013)  (.010)  (.009)
competition  0.005  -0.026*  -0.008  0.019  0.026
(.007)  (.015)  (.013)  (.021)  (.029)
F (NFP=FP)  6.25  21.8  6.4  1.41  0.32
(.013)  (.000)  (.012)  (.236)  (.571)
District effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
LR  13.0  7.7  6.7  35.8  42.1
(.162)  (.564)  (.666)  (.000)  (.000)
Facilities  154  154  154  153  154
Adj. R2  0.97  0.80  0.91  0.58  0.54
Notes:  See notes to table 3.
45Tahble 7. Exit poll
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dep. variable  Antibiotics  Antibiotics  Good treatment  Good treatment
GOV  0.065"  0.021  -O.122"  -0.144 
(.037)  (.046)  (.047)  (.050)
FP  0.012  -0.007  0.079  0.073





unqualified  -0.041  -0.083
(.057)  (.042)
District effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
LR  20.8  19.7  128.8  133.1
(.013)  (.020)  (.000)  (.000)
LR1  8.2
(.017)
Facilities  155  155  155  155
Patients  1516  1516  1156  1156
Adj. R2  0.47  0.47  0.51  0.52
Notes: See notes to table 2. LR1 is likelihood ratio test statistic for testing the nul  hypothesis that (GOV
+ GOV*unqualified)  is zero.
46Table 8a. NFP financial aid - recipients and nonrecipients
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Dep. variable  Receipt of aid
year facility  0.002
established  (.006)
year establ.  -.000
renovated  (.003)
access to  0.129
telephone  (.381)
access to  -.017
newspaper  (.192)
access to radio  -.121
(.164)
distance to  -. 015
subcounty  HQ  (.020)
distance to  0.002
subcounty  HQ  (.003)
number of staff  0.009
(.017)
qualified staff  -.019
(.154)
Observations  42  44  44  43  44  44
R2  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.00
Notes:  OLS regressions with standard errors in parenthesis, constant not reported.
47TalRe Ob. NFP financial aid - recipients and nonrecipients
Regression  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Dep. variable  Receipt of aid
refrigerator  0.048
(.161)




protective clothes  0.000
(.034)
Observations  44  44  44  44
R2  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00
Notes: OLS regressions with standard efrors in parenthesis, constant not reported.
48Table 9. Financial aid
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Dep. variable  Blood slides  Stool tests  OPD charges  Qualified staff  Nursing aides
NFP  -17.8  -12.7  -93  -32,316*  -1,602
(10.8)  (9.8)  (528)  (18,523)  (10,378)
GOV  -25.0  -15.5*  -1,972.  61,256**  42,713*
(7.10)  (6.0)  (262)  (13,573)  (6,800)
NFP*AID  7.5E-6*  6.5E-6'  -3.1E-4*  -0.003  -0.002
(3.4E-6)  (3.2E-6)  (1.5E-4)  (.005)  (.003)
GOV*AID  1.3E-6  -5.0E-6  1.6E-4  0.002  -0.005
(6.7E-6)  (5.6E-6)  (9.2E-5)  (.008)  (.004)
District effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
LR  31.2  39.6  37.2  24.8  113.3
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.003)  (.000)
Facilities  150  144  127  113  114
Observations  150  144  127  278  253
Adj. R2  0.43  0.40  0.82  0.90  0.93
Notes: See notes to table 3.
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